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ABSTRACT 
What kinds of social media users read junk news? We examine the distribution of the most significant sources of 
junk news in the three months before President Donald Trump’s first State of the Union Address. Drawing on a 
list of sources that consistently publish political news and information that is extremist, sensationalist, 
conspiratorial, masked commentary, fake news and other forms of junk news, we find that the distribution of such 
content is unevenly spread across the ideological spectrum. We demonstrate that (1) on Twitter, a network of 
Trump supporters shares the widest range of known junk news sources and circulates more junk news than all the 
other groups put together; (2) on Facebook, extreme hard right pages—distinct from Republican pages—share 
the widest range of known junk news sources and circulate more junk news than all the other audiences put 
together; (3) on average, the audiences for junk news on Twitter share a wider range of known junk news sources 
than audiences on Facebook’s public pages. 
 
POLARIZATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
Social media has become an important source of news 
and information in the United States. An increasing 
number of users consider platforms such as Twitter 
and Facebook a source of news. At important 
moments of political and military crises, social media 
users not only share substantial amounts of 
professional news, but also share extremist, 
sensationalist, conspiratorial, masked commentary, 
fake news and other forms of junk news.1,2 
 News on social media also reaches users 
indirectly, when they browse social media for other 
purposes. With more than 2 billion monthly active 
users, Facebook is the most popular social media 
network. The Reuters Digital News Report 2017 finds 
that 71% of US respondents are on Facebook, with 
48% of US respondents using it for news.3 
Given the central role that social media play 
in public life, these platforms have become a target 
for propaganda campaigns and information 
operations. In its review of the recent US elections, 
Twitter found that more than 50,000 automated 
accounts were linked to Russia.4 Facebook has 
revealed that content from the Russian Internet 
Research Agency has reached 126 million US citizens 
before the 2016 presidential election.5 Adding to 
reports about foreign influence campaigns, there is 
increasing evidence of a rise in polarization in the US 
news landscape in response to the 2016 election. Trust 
in news is strikingly divided across ideological lines, 
and an ecosystem of alternative news is flourishing, 
fueled by extremist, sensationalist, conspiratorial, 
masked commentary, fake news and other forms of 
junk news. At the same time, legacy publishers like 
the New York Times and the Washington Post have 
reported an increase in subscriptions. 
Social media algorithms can be purposefully 
used to distribute polarizing political content and 
misinformation. Pariser’s claim is that filter bubble 
effects—highly personalized algorithms that select 
what information to show in news feeds based on user 
preferences and behavior—have polarized public 
life.6  Vicario et al. find that misinformation on social 
media spreads among homogeneous and polarized 
groups.7 In January 2018, Facebook announced 
changes to its algorithm to prioritize trustworthy 
news, responding to ongoing public debate as to 
whether its algorithms promote junk content.8 
Consequently, social polarization is a driver—just as 
much as it may be a result—of polarized social media 
news consumption patterns. 
In this study, we present a three-month study 
of junk news and political polarization among groups 
of US Twitter and Facebook users. In particular, we 
examine the distribution of posts and comments on 
public pages that contain links to junk news sources, 
across the political spectrum in the US. We then map 
the influence of central sources of junk political news 
and information that regularly publish content on hot 
button issues in the US. In particular, we consider 
patterns of interaction between accounts that have (i) 
shared junk news, (ii) and that have engaged with 
users who disseminate large amounts of 
misinformation about major political issues. 
 
SOCIAL NETWORK MAPPING 
Visualizing social network data is a powerful way of 
understanding how people share information and 
associate with one another. By using selected 
keywords, seed accounts, and known links to 
particular content, it is possible to construct large 
network visualizations. The underlying networks of 
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these visualizations can then be examined to find 
communities of accounts and clusters of association. 
These clusters of accounts and content can then be 
coded with political attributes based on knowledge of 
account history, content type, association metrics and 
social interaction between accounts. 
These social network maps provide insight  
into both social structure and flow of information. In 
this study, we use the Graphika visualization suite to 
map and code accounts that are associated with 
prominent political accounts, topics, political 
affiliations, and geographical areas. Social network 
mapping also allows us to catalogue users and 
content, and generate both descriptive statistics and 
statistical models that explain changes in network 
structure and therefore things like information flow 
over time. 
Social network maps comprise nodes 
representing the individual accounts, which are 
connected to other nodes in the map via social 
relationships. A Fruchterman–Reingold visualization 
algorithm can be used to represent the patterns of 
connection between these nodes.9 It arranges the 
nodes in a visualization through a centrifugal force 
that pushes nodes to the edge and a cohesive force that 
pulls strongly connected nodes together.  This 
mapping process produces focused “segments” of 
users who share very similar and specific kinds of 
content with each other. Segments that share some 
content with each other are aggregated into “groups”. 
The nodes in a network may all belong to a 
group with a shared pattern of interests. These groups 
can be constructed from a number of geographically, 
culturally, or socially similar segments. For example, 
segments of House Democrats, Democratic Party, 
Left-leaning NGOs, Liberal and anti-GOP pages, and 
Liberal Memes could be collectively labeled as a 
“Democratic Party Group”. This method of 
segmenting users, coding groups, and generating 
broad observations about association is an iterative 
process drawing on qualitative, quantitative and 
computational methods. These are run many times 
over a period of time to identify stable and consistent 
communities in a network of social media users.  
 To create a map of segments and groups, we 
use a bipartite graph to provide a structural similarity 
metric between nodes in the map, which is used in 
combination with a clustering algorithm to segment 
the map into distinct communities. For this study, 
hierarchical agglomerative clustering was used to 
automatically generate segments and groups from 
sampled data (see online supplement for details). 
Different social media platforms have their 
own unique attributes that are effective in identifying 
communities that persist over time. For instance, 
clustering Twitter users by following and follower 
relationships yields much more stable communities 
than clustering by mention or retweet relationship. 
Likewise, clustering Facebook users by the “like” 
relationship yields similarly stable results. Therefore, 
for this study, we have used these attributes to 
generate maps of stable clusters on Twitter and 
Facebook.  
The outputs of this clustering algorithm have 
been extensively tested by others in studies of social 
media maps from Iran, Russia and the United 
States.2,10,11 After clustering, the map-making 
process uses supervised machine learning techniques 
to generate labels for segments and groups from a 
training set labeled by human experts. After these 
labels are assigned, they are then manually verified 
and checked for accuracy and consistency.  
 
STUDY SAMPLE AND METHOD 
For this study, a seed of known propaganda websites 
across the political spectrum was used, drawing from 
a sample of 22,117,221 tweets collected during the 
US election, between November 1-11, 2016. (The full 
seed list is in the online supplement and available as 
a standalone spreadsheet.)  We identified sources of 
junk news and information, based on a grounded 
typology. Sources of junk news deliberately publish 
misleading, deceptive or incorrect information 
purporting to be real news about politics, economics 
or culture. This content includes various forms of 
extremist, sensationalist, conspiratorial, masked 
commentary, fake news and other forms of junk news. 
For a source to be labeled as junk news it must fall in 
at least three of the following five domains: 
 
• Professionalism: These outlets do not employ 
the standards and best practices of professional 
journalism. They refrain from providing clear 
information about real authors, editors, 
publishers and owners. They lack transparency, 
accountability, and do not publish corrections on 
debunked information. 
• Style: These outlets use emotionally driven 
language with emotive expressions, hyperbole, 
ad hominem attacks, misleading headlines, 
excessive capitalization, unsafe generalizations 
and fallacies, moving images, graphic pictures 
and mobilizing memes. 
• Credibility: These outlets rely on false 
information and conspiracy theories, which they 
often employ strategically. They report without 
consulting multiple sources and do not employ 
fact-checking methods. Their sources are often 
untrustworthy and their standards of news 
production lack credibility. 
• Bias: Reporting in these outlets is highly biased 
and ideologically skewed, which is otherwise 
described as hyper-partisan reporting. These 
outlets frequently present opinion and 
commentary essays as news. 
• Counterfeit: These outlets mimic professional 
news media. They counterfeit fonts, branding 
and stylistic content strategies. Commentary and 
junk content is stylistically disguised as news, 
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with references to news agencies, and credible 
sources, and headlines written in a news tone, 
with bylines, date, time and location stamps. 
 
         Sources of junk news were evaluated and re-
evaluated in a rigorously iterative coding process. A 
team of 12 trained coders, familiar with the US 
political and media landscape, labeled sources of 
news and information based on a grounded typology. 
The Krippendorff’s alpha value for inter-coder 
reliability among three executive coders, who 
developed the grounded typology, was 0.805. The 91 
sources of political news and information, which we 
identified over the course of several years of research 
and monitoring, produce content that includes various 
forms of propaganda and ideologically extreme, 
hyper-partisan, and conspiratorial political 
information.  We tracked how the URLs to these 
websites were being shared over Twitter and 
Facebook (see online supplement for details). 
Specifically, we computed the coverage and 
consistency scores for each group. Coverage of a 
group refers to the percentage of all propaganda 
domains identified in our junk news sources list that a 
group posted links to. The Consistency of a group 
refers to the percentage of the total of number of links 
to all the propaganda domains identified in our junk 
news sources list, that is shared by the group. A high 
value for coverage shows that the group is sharing a 
wide range of propaganda, while a high value for 
consistency shows that the group is playing a key role 
in the spreading of such propaganda. Coverage and 
consistency scores were calculated from the number 
of links shared from the groups to the junk news 
sources. 
  
FINDING: POLARIZATION AND JUNK NEWS 
ON TWITTER  
Our Twitter dataset contains 13,477 Twitter users 
collected during a 90-day period between October 20, 
2017 and January 18, 2018. To study the polarization 
among US audience groups on Twitter, we first 
identified the accounts of Democratic and Republican 
party members, at both state and national levels. 
Further, we identified Twitter accounts of members of 
congress from both parties. Next, we included all the 
followers of these accounts in our dataset. We 
identified a follower network of 93,711 Twitter 
accounts. We then reduced this sample of Twitter 
users to a set of well-connected accounts using a 
variant of k-core reduction  (see online supplement for 
details).12 This reduced the dataset to 13,477 Twitter 
users. Finally, we collected all Twitter users followed 
by any account in the reduced set of Twitter users, in 
order to segment this set into communities of interest. 
 We used Twitter’s REST API to collect 
publicly available data for our analysis. Twitter’s 
REST API provides data on a) who follows whom on 
Twitter (100% of all data), and b) recent tweets for 
each user (up to 3,200 tweets per user in reverse 
chronological order). 
Twitter’s APIs give access only to public 
data and do not provide any information about 
suspended accounts or users who set their accounts 
private. The latter limitation is not a concern here, 
given that 100% of Twitter users in this study have 
public accounts.13 
Table 1: Size, Coverage and Consistency of US Audience Groups 
on Twitter 
 Users 
N 
Users 
% 
Coverage Consistency 
Conservative Media 1,876 14 95 20 
Democratic Party 576 4 11 0 
Local News 469 3 28 0 
Mainstream 744 6 33 1 
Other 876 6 67 2 
Party Politics 1,343 10 52 1 
Progressive Movement 1,149 9 36 1 
Republican Party 845 6 58 1 
Resistance 3,663 27 62 18 
Trump Support 1,936 14 96 55 
Average 1,348 10 54 10 
Total 13,477 100 .. .. 
 
Table 2: Heterophily Index for US Audience Groups on Twitter 
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Conservative Media 2.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.6 0.2 1.3 
Democratic Party 0.5 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 0.9       1.4  0.4 
Mainstream Media 0.8 1.7 3.3 1.3 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.9 1.2   0.2       
Other 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.7 
Local News  0.7 1.5 1.2 1.1 2.4 1.1 1.1 1.2  0.5 0.3 
Party Politics 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.1 1.5 0.7 0.6 
Progressive  0.3 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.9 0.7 1.0 0.2 
Republican Party 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.5 0.5 1.4 
Resistance 0.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.5 2.0 0.0 
Trump Support 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.4 0.0 4.0 
 
Figure 1:  US Audience Groups on Twitter 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 20/10/17-20/01/ 
2018. Note: Groups are determined through network association 
and our interpretation of the kinds of content these users distribute. 
This is a basic visualization, see online supplement  for a full 
visualization.  
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We were able to group our sample of 13,477 
user accounts into 10 groups of affiliation. The groups 
emerged through network association, and by 
interpretation of the kinds of content these users 
distributed and indicated as a “favorite”. Table 1 
identifies the main groupings of US Twitter users 
sampled, as labelled by our iterative machine-learning 
process and expert manual review.  
From Table 1, we see that the Trump 
Support Group has a coverage of 96%, indicating that 
those pages share the widest range of junk sources on 
Twitter. This is followed by the Conservative Media 
Group, with a coverage of 95%. We also see from 
Table 1 that the Trump Support group, with a 
consistency score of 55%, contributes more to the 
spreading of junk news, compared to all other groups 
put together.  
Next, we next calculated a heterophily score 
for each combination of group pairings. This is a 
measure of the connections between groups in a 
network, where a ratio is calculated of the actual ties 
between two groups, compared with the expected 
number of ties between them, if all the ties in the 
network were distributed evenly. We calculate ties for 
groups on Twitter from follower accounts and 
accounts followed, and Facebook ties from page likes. 
The natural log of the ratios is then taken along with 
a zero correction to create a balanced index. A high 
heterophily score between groups indicates more 
connections between the two groups. A high 
heterophily score for a group to itself indicates a high 
number of within-group connections. It is important 
to note however that these scores indicate only first 
order (direct) connections between groups, and not 
second, third, or higher-order (indirect) connections. 
These values are shown in Table 2. 
From Table 2, we see that the Democratic 
Party Group and the Mainstream Media Group have a 
heterophily index of 1.7, indicating a deep connection 
between the two groups. A heterophily score of 1.0 
would indicate a perfectly neutral level of connection 
between groups; less than 1.0 would indicate a lack of 
connection. Similarly, we see that the Republican 
Party Group shares a heterophily index of 1.6 with the 
Conservative Media Group, indicating strong 
interactions between them. The Democratic Party also 
shares a high heterophily index of 1.9 with the 
Progressive Movement Group, demonstrating 
significant interaction. The Mainstream Media Group 
also shares a high heterophily score with both the 
Progressive Movement (1.5), and the Resistance (1.2) 
Groups. The Republican Party and Trump Supporters 
share a heterophily score of 1.4, also indicating a 
strong connection between them.  
Figure 1 is a basic visualization of the 10 
groups on Twitter. The size of each group is 
determined by the number of Twitter accounts that 
belong to it (see Table 1). The connections between 
the groups in the figure are computed using the 
heterophily scores (see Table 2). The width of the line 
Table 3: Size, Coverage and Consistency of US Audience Groups 
on Facebook 
 Users 
N 
Users 
% 
Coverage Consistency 
Conspiracy 946 9 40 5 
Democratic Party 1,144 11 40 12 
Environmental Movement 954 9 13 1 
Hard Conservative 815 8 91 58 
Libertarians 209 2 34 4 
Military Guns 397 4 45 4 
Occupy 1,114 10 38 7 
Other Left 673 6 6 2 
Other Non-Political  1,688 16 13 2 
Public Health 733 7 4 0 
Republican Party 241 2 15 1 
Sustainable Farming 1,144 11 19 2 
Women’s Rights 633 6 13 1 
Average 765 7 33 9 
Total 10,691 100 .. .. 
 
 
Table 4: Heterophily Index for US Audience Groups on Facebook 
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Conspiracy 5.0 0.8 0.5 0.4 2.5 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 
Democratic 
Party 
0.8 5.0 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.8 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.7 
Environmental 
Movement  
0.5 0.6 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.6 0.2 
Hard 
Conservative 
0.4 0.2 0.0 9.2 2.2 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.8 0.1 0.0 
Libertarians 2.5 0.6 0.0 2.2 26 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 
Military Guns 0.2 0.2 0.1 2.0 0.6 18 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.1 
Occupy 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 6.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 
Other Left 0.1 1.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 8.6 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.9 
Other Non-
Political 
0.8 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.7 3.0 1.3 0.5 0.8 0.7 
Public Health 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.3 1.3 7.2 0.3 0.5 1.6 
Republican 
Party 
0.0 0.7 0.0 1.8 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 25 0.0 0.1 
Sustainable 
Farming 
0.4 0.2 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.0 5.4 0.2 
Women’s 
Rights 
0.1 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.7 1.6 0.1 0.2 9.4 
 
Figure 2:  US Audience Groups on Facebook 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 20/10/17-20/01/ 
2018. Note: Groups are determined through network association 
and our interpretation of the kinds of content these users distribute. 
This is a basic visualization, see online supplement for a full 
visualization.  
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linking groups in the figure, represents the strength of 
connection between them. 
 
FINDING: POLARIZATION AND JUNK NEWS 
ON PUBLIC FACEBOOK PAGES  
We mapped the public Facebook pages by combining: 
1) harvested Facebook public page seeds from 
political tweets shared during the US election and a 
snowball sample of the wider Facebook network 
around these key online interest groups; 2) a snowball 
sample of all the Facebook pages associated with 
party Twitter accounts considered for the Twitter 
study; 3) iteration of clear US Liberal and 
Conservative clusters from previous US political 
maps on Facebook.  
This resulted in a dataset of 47,719 public 
Facebook pages. We then reduced this sample to a set 
of well-connected pages using a variant of k-core 
reduction  (see online supplement for details) From 
this reduced dataset of 10,691 pages, we collected all 
posts from the 90 days between October 20, 2017 and 
January 19, 2018, using the Facebook Graph API. We 
extracted all URLs from posts, and analyzed the 
pattern of web citations across the major groupings 
we identified in the US news ecosystem on Facebook. 
Additionally, we collected the share counts for all 
posts containing the identified URLs from our seed 
list in order to measure the degree to which junk news 
content from various sources is shared across the 
Facebook network. This value includes shares that 
occur on private pages.  
  Table 3 identifies the main groupings of the 
US Facebook pages sampled. The Facebook groups 
were identified by following the same procedure that 
we used for the Twitter dataset.  
From the coverage and consistency scores in 
Table 3, we see that the Hard Conservatives Group 
has a coverage score of 91%, followed by the Military 
and Guns Group at 45% and then the Conspiracy 
Group and Democrats Group at 40%. The Hard 
Conservatives Group also has a consistency score of 
58%, indicating that this group has a greater share in 
the distribution of junk news on Facebook than all the 
other groups put together.  
 The heterophily scores for each pair of 
Facebook groups is shown in Table 4. We see that the 
heterophily score between the Conspiracy Group and 
almost all other groups is less than 1.0, indicating a 
low level of social interaction. The two key 
exceptions are the Libertarians Group at 2.5 and the 
Occupy Group at 1.0. These scores show that the 
Conspiracy Group is most connected to the fringes of 
the US political spectrum. Further, we observe that 
the Hard Conservative and the Libertarian Groups 
also interact closely with each other (heterophily 
score of 2.2).  
Figure 2 is a basic visualization of the 13 
groups on Facebook. The size of each group is 
determined by the number of Facebook pages that 
belong to it (see Table 3). The connections between 
the groups in the figure are computed using the 
heterophily scores (see Table 4). The width of the 
lines linking groups in the figure represents the 
strength of connection between them. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
On Twitter, the Trump Support Group shares 95% of 
the junk news sites on the watch list, and accounted 
for 55% of junk news traffic in the sample. Other 
kinds of audiences shared content from these junk 
news sources, but at much lower levels. On Facebook, 
the Hard Conservative Group shares 91% of the junk 
news sites on the watch list, and accounted for 58% 
of junk news traffic in the sample.  The coverage and 
consistency scores for Facebook and Twitter reveal 
some important features of these platforms when it 
comes to junk news circulation. The average coverage 
score for the major audiences of junk news on Twitter 
and Facebook is 54 and 33, respectively.  This means 
that on average, groups of Twitter share 54% of the 
junk news watch list and groups of Facebook users 
share 33%.  
The social networks mapped from public 
Twitter and Facebook data show that the junk political 
news and information was concentrated among 
Trump’s supporters. The two main political parties, 
Democrats and Republicans, prefer different sources 
of political news, with limited overlap. For instance, 
the Democratic Party shows high levels of 
engagement with mainstream media sources and the 
Republican Party with Conservative Media Groups. 
On Twitter in particular, the Democratic Party have 
interacted closely with the Progressive Movements 
Group, suggesting a broad intersection of interests. 
On Facebook, most connections between groups 
conform to the partisan polarization found on Twitter. 
We also find close interactions between the Occupy 
Group and the Conspiracy Group. 
 
ONLINE SUPPLEMENTS AND DATA SHEETS 
Please visit comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk for additional 
material related to the analysis, including (1) high-
resolution maps of the networks for both Twitter and 
Facebook, showing all accounts separated into 48 
segments within the 10 groups on Twitter, and 48 
segments within the 13 groups on Facebook, (2) the 
full list of segments and groups, (3) calculation of 
heterophily scores, (4) detailed explanation of the 
hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm used 
to create groupings, (5) the k-core reduction used to 
reduce the set of Twitter users, (6) a detailed 
description of the junk news classification 
methodology and, (7) a list of the junk news sites that 
we used for this study. 
 
ABOUT THE PROJECT 
The Project on Computational Propaganda 
(http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/) involves international, 
and interdisciplinary, researchers in the investigation 
of the impact of automated scripts—computational 
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propaganda—on public life. Data Memos are 
designed to present quick snapshots of analysis on 
current events in a short format. They reflect 
methodological experience and considered analysis, 
but have not been peer-reviewed. Working Papers 
present deeper analysis and extended arguments that 
have been collegially reviewed and that engage with 
public issues. The Project’s articles, book chapters 
and books are significant manuscripts that have been 
through peer review and formally published.  
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1. US Audience Groups on Twitter 
Each node in this network (Figure 1) represents an account on Twitter. Each node belongs to 
both a broad group and a smaller segment within that group. A segment is a collection of nodes 
with a shared pattern of interest while a group is a collection of segments that are politically, 
culturally, or socially similar. The size of each node is proportional to the number of other 
nodes that follow it on Twitter. The color of each node is based on its parent segment. Figure 
1 is the full color visualization of the US audience groups we found on Twitter. 
 
Figure 1: Full Illustration of US Audience Groups on Twitter 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 20/10/17-20/01/18. Note: Groups are determined through 
network association and our interpretation of the kinds of content these users distribute.  
 
 
The nodes are placed within the map using a Fruchterman-Reingold visualization algorithm. 
This works to place nodes on the map according to two principles: first, a “centrifugal force” 
acts upon each node to push it to the edge of the canvas; second, a “cohesive force” acts upon 
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every connected pair of nodes to pull them closer together. Table 1 gives a full list of Twitter 
groups and associated segments considered in this study. 
 
Table 1: Groups and Segments for the Twitter Visualization 
Groups Segments 
Conservative Media Conservative Blogs 
Conservative Truth 
GOP Communications 
Hard Right Journalists 
Right Wing Media 
Watch Dogs 
Democratic Party House Democrats 
State Democrats 
Local News Bay Area News 
Health News 
NYC News 
Texas Journalists 
Mainstream Media Left Wing Political Journalists 
News Anchors 
Other Brand Digital Marketing 
EU, Euro Organizations 
SMM Tech/Finance 
Party Politics  Bi-Partisan Research 
GOP, Democrats Communications 
House – GOP 
US Congress 
US Senate 
Progressive Movement African American Culture and Empowerment 
Latino Empowerment and Non-profits 
Race and Grassroots 
Wage reform and Economic Justice 
Republican Party GOP 
Organized GOP 
Resistance Anti-Trump Political Analysts 
Anti-Trump, Human Rights, Humor 
Impeach Trump 
Pro Hilary – I’m with Her 
Resist – Analysts 
Resist – Trump 
Resist – Equal Rights 
Resist – Progressive 
The Resistance – Not My President 
Unite Democrats 
Women’s Issues 
Trump Support  Defend Trump/Lifestyle/Humor 
Patriots for Trump 
Re-elect Trump 
Trump Supporters MAGA 
Trump Train 
Trump Victory 
Trump Victory Party 
 
2. US Audience Groups on Facebook 
Each node in this network (Figure 2) represents a public page on Facebook. The size of each 
node corresponds to the number of other nodes that like the page on Facebook. Each node 
belongs to both a broad group and a smaller segment within that group. A segment is a 
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collection of nodes with a shared pattern of interest while a group is a collection of segments 
that are politically, culturally, or socially similar. 
 
Figure 2: Full Illustration of US Audience Groups on Facebook  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 20/10/17-20/01/18. Note: Groups are determined 
through network association and our interpretation of the kinds of content these users distribute.  
 
Again, a Fruchterman-Reingold visualization algorithm is used to place nodes within the map. 
Table 2 gives a full list of the Facebook groups and associated segments considered in this 
study. 
 
Table 2: List of Groups and Segments for the Facebook Visualization 
Groups Segments 
Conspiracy Conspiracy Theories 
Infowars 
International anti-media conspiracy 
Truthers 
Democratic Party Anti-GOP 
Atheism 
Democratic Humor 
Democratic Memes 
Democratic Party 
House Democrats 
Non-profit campaigns 
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Groups Segments 
 
 
Environmental Movement Animal rights 
Animal, wilderness conservation 
Anti-fracking, eco defense 
Anti-GMO 
International climate action 
International Greenpeace 
Native American, eco resistance 
Hard Conservatives Anti-immigration 
Anti-liberal 
Hard Conservatives Media 
Patriots, Pro-Military, Militia 
Libertarians Anarchist 
Libertarian Institutes 
Military/Guns  Guns, Guns Ownership 
US Army, Navy, Veterans 
Occupy International Anarchist 
International Anonymous 
International Occupy chapters 
International Occupy movement 
US Occupy movement 
Other Left  ACLU 
Grassroots movements 
Immigrant Advocacy 
Labor reform 
Organized Labor, Trade Unions 
US and International LGBT advocacy 
Other Non-Political Food blogs 
Life coach, inspirational groups 
Miscellaneous Influencers 
Music, music clusters, SMM 
Parenting 
Spiritualism 
Un-clustered 
US and International Art, Art museums 
Public Health Global Health 
Health organizations 
Public initiatives 
US State Departments, US Consulates 
Republican Party GOP Congress 
GOP Senate 
Sustainable Farming  Gardening sustainability 
Healthy eating bloggers 
Organic farming 
Organic food 
Small farming, self-sufficiency 
Survivalist 
Sustainable agriculture and research 
Women’s Rights Feminist groups 
International women’s rights 
Planned Parenthood 
Reproductive rights 
 
3. Heterophily Index 
For every pairing of groups within a network map, a value of heterophily can be calculated. 
This is a measure of the level of connection between the groups. In order to determine this a 
ratio is calculated between the actual ties between two groups, compared to the expected ties 
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between the groups if all the accounts in the map were evenly distributed. The natural log of 
these ratios is then taken, along with a zero correction to create a balanced index and to ensure 
that all values are displayed in a positive form.  
 
 
å
å
=
pairings all
pairing
pairings all
pairing
  
sConnection
sConnection
sConnection
sConnection
RatiosofRatio T  
 
Expression A:  Ratio of Two Ratios 
 
This heterophily index is therefore created through a ratio of two ratios. This ratio reveals 
whether two nodes have about the proportion of links they should have given its size. This is 
displayed in Expression A, where a pairing of groups is calculated as having a measure of 
connections in balance with its share of all the connections. 
  
Half the distribution of possible values from this ratio of ratios ranges from 0 to 1 
(corresponding to disproportionately small share of connections in a group given its size) and 
the other half ranges from 1 to +infinity (a disproportionately large share of connections in a 
group given its size). However, by taking the natural log of the ratio of ratios the index will 
become more balanced: from -infinity to 0 becomes less than proportionate share, and from 0 
to +infinity becomes more than proportionate share. For example, take a three-group network 
(A, B and C). If nodes in group A have a total of ten connections, and there are ten nodes in 
each group, then the expected connections between A and B will be 3.33. If, in reality, the 
nodes in group A actually have all ten connections to nodes in group B then this connection is 
stronger than expected. The heterophily score for groups A and B = 10/3.33 = 3.0. The natural 
log of this is then taken along with a zero correction across the range of heterophily values.  
 
A greater heterophily index indicates a denser pattern of connections between the two groups. It 
is important to note however that these scores indicate only first order connections, not second 
or third order connections. 
 
4. Clustering Algorithm for Determining Groups and Segments 
In order to generate segments and groups for each map it is necessary to employ a clustering 
algorithm. This involves first building a bipartite graph between nodes in the map and the rest 
of the social medium in question. This bipartite graph provides a structural similarity metric 
between nodes in the map. This was then used in combination with a hierarchical agglomerative 
clustering algorithm in order to segment a map into distinct communities. This is a ‘bottom up’ 
approach whereby each observation starts in its own cluster, and pairs of clusters are merged 
as one moves up the hierarchy. Twitter maps are clustered based on follower-relationships, 
since mention-relationships have been shown to overemphasize the news cycle and salient 
external events. Facebook networks are clustered based on page likes. 
 
5. K-core reduction  
To identify and map the ‘discussion core’ of the most active, connected, and influential users, 
we performed a k-core reduction to reduce the total collected set of Twitter users from the 
initial data collection into a set of well-connected accounts. This produces a maximally 
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connected subgraph of active nodes with degree of connection at least ‘k’. This degree of 
connection, k, can be thought of as the number of links between each node in the graph. For 
example, selecting a k value of 0 for the reduction does not remove any nodes from the graph, 
since each node must have 0 connections or greater. Selecting a k value of 1 would remove all 
of the nodes that have no connections to other nodes in the graph. Selecting a k value of 2 
would remove all nodes with fewer than 2 connections, and so on. A value of k was selected 
such that the k-core consisted of 12,413 users. This value was found to be a sufficiently large 
group to represent the major sets of highly active users, but not so large as to make clustering 
and visualization impractical. 
 
6. Junk News Classification 
These sources deliberately publish misleading, deceptive or incorrect information purporting 
to be real news about politics, economics or culture. This content includes various forms of 
propaganda and ideologically extreme, hyper-partisan, or conspiratorial news and information. 
For a source to be labelled as junk news at least three of the following five characteristics must 
apply: 
 
• Professionalism: These outlets do not employ the standards and best practices of 
professional journalism. They refrain from providing clear information about real 
authors, editors, publishers and owners. They lack transparency, accountability, and do 
not publish corrections on debunked information. 
• Style: These outlets use emotionally driven language with emotive expressions, 
hyperbole, ad hominem attacks, misleading headlines, excessive capitalization, unsafe 
generalizations and fallacies, moving images, graphic pictures and mobilizing memes. 
• Credibility: These outlets rely on false information and conspiracy theories, which they 
often employ strategically. They report without consulting multiple sources and do not 
employ fact-checking methods. Their sources are often untrustworthy and their 
standards of news production lack credibility. 
• Bias: Reporting in these outlets is highly biased and ideologically skewed, which is 
otherwise described as hyper-partisan reporting. These outlets frequently present 
opinion and commentary essays as news. 
• Counterfeit: These outlets mimic professional news media. They counterfeit fonts, 
branding and stylistic content strategies. Commentary and junk content is stylistically 
disguised as news, with references to news agencies, and credible sources, and 
headlines written in a news tone, with bylines, date, time and location stamps. 
 
Table 3 gives a list of the all junk news sources used for this analysis. 
 
Table 3: List of Junk News Sources 
Domain Name Example URL 
100percentfedup.com http://100percentfedup.com/wow-woman-delivers-knock-out-punch-to-michelle-
obama-on-way-to-polls-yes-i-am-black-but-i-am-not-voting-democrati-am-not-on-
that-plantation-video/ 
allenbwest.com http://www.allenbwest.com/michellejesse/bombshell-new-email-shows-pentagon-
tried-to-send-help-in-benghazi-but 
americanthinker.com http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/10/what_kind_of_genius_loses_6_billi
on_hillary.html 
anonews.co http://www.anonews.co/hillary-clinton-exposed/ 
barenakedislam.com http://www.barenakedislam.com/2016/11/03/fbi-sources-believe-clinton-foundation-
case-is-likely-moving-toward-an-indictment/ 
beforeitsnews.com http://beforeitsnews.com/politics/2016/11/breaking-wikileaks-to-drop-hillarys-33k-
deleted-emails-tomorrow-video-2855077.html 
	
	
7 
Domain Name Example URL 
bipartisanreport.com http://bipartisanreport.com/2016/09/09/just-in-barbara-bush-verbally-dissects-any-
woman-who-votes-for-donald-trump-video/ 
bizpacreview.com http://www.bizpacreview.com/2016/11/04/refuse-pawn-huffpo-writer-latino-activist-
recants-hillary-support-powerful-op-ed-408408 
bredred.com http://bredred.com/republicans-have-cast-17000-more-votes-than-dems-in-fl/ 
breitbart.com http://www.breitbart.com/video/2016/11/06/nate-silver-clinton-one-state-away-losing-
electoral-college/ 
campusreform.org https://www.campusreform.org/?id=8352 
centerforsecuritypolicy.org https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/civilization-jihad-reader-series/ 
clintonemail.com http://clintonemail.com 
cnsnews.com http://cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/americans-not-labor-force-participation-
rate-risesdrops 
commonsense-
conservative.org http://commonsense-conservative.org/?p=1761 
concealncarry.stfi.re http://concealncarry.stfi.re/forum/forum/general-discussions/2nd-amendent-
discussions/778-why-i-carry-a-gun-by-urban-carry-holsters?sf=eyenxnw 
conservativedailypost.com https://conservativedailypost.com/breaking-fbi-confirms-evidence-of-huge-
underground-clinton-sex-network/ 
conservativeoutfitters.com https://www.conservativeoutfitters.com/blogs/news/92961857-john-kasich-took-202-
700-from-george-soros 
conservativeread.com http://conservativeread.com/vote-like-your-guns-depend-on-it-they-do-
trumppence16/#.wcibkuhgady.twitter 
conservativereview.com https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2016/11/this-new-ted-cruz-video-
is-the-last-obamacare-fact-check-you-will-ever-need 
conservativetribune.com https://conservativetribune.com/wikileaks-reveals-what-bill-
hiding/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=conserv_tribune 
constitution.com http://constitution.com/iran-reports-u-s-supplying-isis/ 
crooksandliars.com http://crooksandliars.com/2016/11/latinos-nevada-and-florida-are-building 
dailycaller.com http://dailycaller.com/2016/10/30/hillary-clinton-knew-she-was-helping-islamists-
move-into-power-in-
libya/?utm_campaign=atdailycaller&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social 
dailynewsbin.com http://www.dailynewsbin.com/?p=26577 
dangerandplay.com http://www.dangerandplay.com/2016/11/02/how-a-mindset-expert-who-hates-politics-
got-involved-with-maga3x/ 
dcclothesline.com http://www.dcclothesline.com/2016/11/02/confirmed-us-intel-operatives-leaked-
clinton-campaign-emails-not-russia/ 
deepstatenation.com http://deepstatenation.com/2016/11/oklahoma-republican-calls-for-hillary-clinton-to-
be-shot-to-death-screenshots/ 
dennismichaellynch.com http://dennismichaellynch.com/podestacooking1/ 
donaldtrumpnews.co http://donaldtrumpnews.co/news/biggest-star-comes-trump-matthew-mcconaughey-
votes-trump/ 
drudgereport.com http://www.drudgereport.com/ 
endingthefed.com http://endingthefed.com/breaking-bombshell-wikileaks-exposes-democrats-fake-
trump-groping-plot.html 
eutimes.net http://www.eutimes.net/2016/10/hillary-clintons-sudden-move-of-1-8-billion-to-qatar-
central-bank-stuns-financial-world/ 
floppingaces.net http://www.floppingaces.net/2016/10/09/enabler-hillarys-actions-speak-louder-than-
trumps-words-guest-post/?platform=hootsuite 
freebeacon.com http://freebeacon.com/politics/mccaskill-fbi-probe-exists-legitimate-question-whether-
clinton-broke-law/ 
frontpagemag.com http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/264540/seven-clinton-policy-priorities-would-
devastate-john-perazzo 
gotnews.com http://gotnews.com/breaking-ex-apprentice-summerzervos-paid-500000-gloriaallred-
accuse-trump-deal-went-others/ 
hannity.com http://www.hannity.com/articles/hanpr-election-493995/watch-undercover-journalist-
in-full-burka-15277316/ 
hotair.com http://hotair.com/archives/2016/11/10/newt-has-no-time-for-whiny-sniveling-
negative-nevertrump-cowards/ 
hotpagenews.com http://hotpagenews.com/r/162858 
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Domain Name Example URL 
infowars.com http://www.infowars.com/spirit-cooking-clinton-campaign-chairman-invited-to-
bizarre-satanic-performance/ 
inquisitr.com https://www.inquisitr.com/3680558/new-wikileaks-emails-suggest-bernie-sanders-
was-leveraged-into-endorsing-clinton/ 
joeforamerica.com http://joeforamerica.com/?p=55358 
judicialwatch.org http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-court-hearing-
monday-november-7-fbi-clinton-email-records-case/ 
lawnews.tv http://lawnews.tv/wikileaks-clinton-camp-worried-uranium-one-deal-being-
investigated-hillary-sold-20-of-americas-uranium-to-russia/ 
lifenews.com http://www.lifenews.com/2016/10/31/black-pastor-urges-christians-hillarys-
deplorables-to-vote-for-donald-trump/ 
magafeed.com http://magafeed.com/the_donald-uncovers-dark-connections-between-the-clintons-
convicted-child-abductor/ 
mediaite.com https://www.mediaite.com/tv/nbc-news-pete-williams-reports-fbi-really-isnt-
conducting-clinton-foundation-investigation/ 
mobile.wnd.com http://mobile.wnd.com/2016/11/obama-claims-presidents-have-power-to-violate-
constitution/#xhmqgbuwzzr6y9wd.99 
mostdamagingwikileaks.com http://www.mostdamagingwikileaks.com/ 
mrctv.org http://www.mrctv.org/blog/flashback-jesse-jackson-praises-trump-seriousness-and-
commitment-diversity-project 
nationalreview.com http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/442059/dont-blame-clinton-trump-2016-
wouldve-beaten-obama-2012 
naturalnews.com http://www.naturalnews.com/055879_associated_press_eric_tucker_dishonest_journal
ism.html 
newsbusters.org http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/nb/kyle-drennen/2016/11/03/nets-ignore-massive-
bombshell-fbi-investigation-clinton-corruption 
newsmax.com http://www.newsmax.com/politics/trump-president-salary-
refuse/2015/09/18/id/692155/ 
nydailynews.com http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/calif-woman-accusing-trump-child-rape-
break-silence-article-1.2855631 
occupydemocrats.com http://occupydemocrats.com/2016/11/03/fox-news-just-admitted-made-story-hillary-
indicted-foundation/ 
pamelageller.com http://pamelageller.com/2016/11/must-see-video-undercover-journalist-in-full-burka-
is-offered-huma-abedins-ballot-voterfraud.html/ 
pastebin.com http://pastebin.com/36q0yksm 
patdollard.com http://www.patdollard.com/75-of-americans-say-media-biased-for-hillary/ 
patriotpost.us https://patriotpost.us/articles/45877 
politopinion.com http://politopinion.com/2016/11/undercover-pv-offered-huma-ballot/ 
puppetstringnews.com http://www.puppetstringnews.com/blog/black-voters-for-trump-double-from-2012-
election 
rasmussenreports.com http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/elections/election_2016/whi
te_house_watch_nov3 
redstate.com http://www.redstate.com/aglanon/2016/11/07/for-the-sake-of-the-republican-party-
dont-vote-for-trump/ 
redstatewatcher.com http://redstatewatcher.com/article.asp?id=46969 
scooprocket.com http://scooprocket.com/us/2016/11/01/fbi-dumps-documents-from-bill-clintons-
pardon-of-tax-cheat/ 
shareblue.com http://shareblue.com/60-million-hillary-voters-will-not-be-silenced/ 
silenceisconsent.net http://silenceisconsent.net/explosive-proof-hillary-tied-to-child-trafficker-laura-silsby 
stateofthenation2012.com http://stateofthenation2012.com/?p=54773 
theamericanfirst.com http://theamericanfirst.com/video-cnn-interviews-leftist-protester-later-revealed-as-
cnn-cameraman/ 
theamericanmirror.com http://www.theamericanmirror.com/obama-talks-207-times-campaigning-hillary/ 
theblacksphere.net http://theblacksphere.net/2016/11/michelle-obama-deleted-hillary-from-twitter/ 
theconservativetreehouse.com https://theconservativetreehouse.com/2016/11/01/epic-rick-santorum-blasts-
nevertrump-and-john-kasich-video/ 
thefederalist.com http://thefederalist.com/2016/11/04/im-voting-trump-street-fighter-can-take-clinton-
machine/#.wb4y8g-asaq.twitter 
thefederalistpapers.org http://thefederalistpapers.org/?p=100260 
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Domain Name Example URL 
thegatewaypundit.com http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2016/11/donald-trump-takes-nearly-6-point-lead-
crookedhillary-latest-la-times-poll/ 
theodysseyonline.com https://www.theodysseyonline.com/calling-millennials-lets-break-party-system 
thepoliticalinsider.com http://www.thepoliticalinsider.com/police-sources-confirm-officials-charges-bill-
clinton-pedophile/ 
therealstrategy.com https://therealstrategy.com/wikileaks-admits-source-dnc-leaks-murdered-clintons/ 
therebel.media https://www.therebel.media/congratulations_america_you_won_your_second_war_of
_independence 
truepundit.com http://truepundit.com/breaking-bombshell-nypd-blows-whistle-on-new-hillary-emails-
money-laundering-sex-crimes-with-children-child-exploitation-pay-to-play-perjury/ 
truthfeed.com http://truthfeed.com/breaking-new-wikileak-bombshell-shows-cnn-asked-the-dnc-
what-questions-to-ask-trump/34331/ 
ukok.page.tl http://ukok.page.tl/trump-train.htm 
usalibertynews.com http://usalibertynews.com/breaking-la-times-reporter-fired-tweeting-wants-trump-
dead/ 
vaskal.ca http://www.vaskal.ca/podestafiles 
weaselzippers.us https://www.weaselzippers.us/305882-fbi-agents-are-now-talking-say-comey-stood-
in-the-way-of-clinton-email-investigation/ 
westernjournalism.com https://www.westernjournalism.com/lawsuit-filed-against-attorney-general-loretta-
lynch-over-tarmac-meeting-with-bill-
clinton/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=mobilefloatingsharingbuttons&utm_cont
ent=2016-11-02&utm_campaign=websitesharingbuttons 
wnd.com http://www.wnd.com/2016/10/clintons-black-son-to-make-bombshell-announcement/ 
youngcons.com http://www.youngcons.com/clinton-foundation-doctored-memo-to-cover-distributing-
watered-down-aids-medicine-in-africa/ 
yournewswire.com http://yournewswire.com/nypd-hillary-clinton-child-sex-scandal/ 
 
